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There is a struggle throughout the world on the issue of justiciability of socio-economic rights. It is 
forcefully argued that socio-economic rights should be given the same status as that of civil 
political rights. Ensuring the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights has been considered a 
prime issue in this regard. In Bangladesh, Part II of the Constitution embodies the socio-economic 
rights as “Fundamental Principles of State Policy” whereas “Fundamental Rights” consisting of 
Civil Political rights find place in Part III. Article 8(2) of the Constitution makes the Principles and 
thereby the socio-economic rights judicially non-enforceable. This provision came under judicial 
consideration in Kudrat-e-Elahi v. Bangladesh case. The Appellate Division relied on non-
enforceability criteria (in article 8(2)) to hold that a law cannot be repealed only on the ground of 
inconsistency with fundamental principles. This article attempts to submit the opposite. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Constitution of Bangladesh (1972) creates a 
dichotomy between civil and political rights and 
economic, social and cultural right by making the 
former enforceable by the court and the latter non-
enforceable.  
 
Economic, social and cultural rights are included in 
Part II of the Constitution as “fundamental 
principles of state policy” (articles 8 to 25). These 
include the equal rights of women, principles of 
ownership, provision of basic necessities of life 
including food, clothing, shelter, education and 
medical care, and worker’s rights. Article 8(2) 
explicitly states that these principles are not 
judicially enforceable. It reads as follows: 
 
“The principles set out in this part shall be 
fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, 
shall be applied by the state in making of laws, 
shall be a guide to the interpretation of the 
constitution and of the other laws of Bangladesh, 
and shall form the basis of the work of the state and 
of its citizens, but shall not be judicially 
enforceable.” 
 
Part III of the Constitution embodies the 
‘fundamental rights’, encompassing mainly civil 
and political rights (articles 26 to 47). Unlike Part 
II, the rights in Part III are justiciable. Citizens 
have the right to approach the High Court Division 
to redress any infringement of the rights (article 
44). Again the Constitution provides that laws 
inconsistent with the rights shall be void to the 
extent of such inconsistency (article 26) there being 
no such provision regarding the principles in part 
II. 
 
The status of the fundamental principles of state 
policy (FPSP) within the fabric of the constitution 
has come under judicial scrutiny in Kudrat-E-Elahi 
Panir and Others v Bangladesh 44DLR (AD) 319 
where the appellants relying on article 7 of the 
Constitution tried to convince the court that a law 
inconsistent with any of the FPSP is void. Article 7 
deals with the supremacy of the Constitution, and 
sub section 2 provides that “if any other law is 
inconsistent with this Constitution that other law 
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”. 
To negative the contention, the Court interpreted 
article 7(2) along with article 8(2) in a pessimistic 
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approach. This article is an attempt to prove into 
the worth of such non-liberal literal interpretation 
of the constitution and intends to submit that the 
constitution doesn’t bar repelling a law conflicting 
with any of the ESC rights placed in Part II. 
 
II. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDER 
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
 
The above mentioned case concerned a challenge 
to Ordinance No. XXXVII of 1991 (that 
subsequently became Act No. II of 1992) which 
abolished the elected Upazila Parishads (the third 
tier of the local government) and vested in the 
government all rights, powers, authorities and 
privileges of the dissolved Upazilla Parishads. The 
appellants, some chairmen of dissolved Upazilla 
Parishads, unsuccessfully challenged the law in the 
High Court Division and therafter obtaining leave 
to appeal appeared before the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. 
 
The Ordinance was challenged on two grounds. 
First, it violates article 59 of the constitution. 
Article 59 provides that local government in every 
administrative unit shall be entrusted to bodies 
composed of elected representative of the people. 
Article 152(1) of the Constitution defines 
administrative unit as ‘a district or other area 
designated by law for the purposes of article 59’. 
The court rejected the contention holding that 
though all the local government institutions must 
conform to article 59, the Upazilla was never 
designated to be an administrative unit for the 
purpose of article 59. Hence the abolition of 
Upazilla didn’t attract the mischief of article 59 
(Kamal Mustafa, 1994:131). 
 
Second, the appellants argued that the Ordinance 
being inconsistent with articles 9 and 11 runs 
against the spirit of the Constitution and becomes 
void by the operation of article 7(2). Article 9 
emphasises on maintaining democratically elected 
local government institutions. The State shall 
encourage local government institutions ‘composed 
of representatives of the areas concerned’ with 
special representation given to peasants, workers 
and women. Article 11 affirms the democratic 
nature of the state, in which fundamental human 
rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and 
worth of the human person are guaranteed and the 
effective participation of people through their 
‘elected representatives’ in administration at all 
levels is ensured. 
In the main judgement Ahmed Shahabuddin CJ 
held that articles 9 and 11 being located in Part II 
of the constitution are not judicially enforceable. If 
the State does not or cannot implement these 
principles the Court cannot compel the state to do 
so and other such fundamental principles also stand 
on the same footing (para 22 p. 331).  
 
Kamal J concurring with Shahabuddin CJ based his 
reasoning on the following two points: 
First, while there is a specific provision in the 
Constitution dealing with laws that are inconsistent 
with civil and political rights (article 26), there is 
no specific provision on laws that are inconsistent 
with fundamental principles of state policy. To him 
the omission is deliberate and calculated because 
provisions analogous to article 26 could have been 
inserted in part II as well. 
 
Second, under article 7(2), any law that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution shall be void to 
the extent of the inconsistency. Kamal J observed 
that the Constitution itself in article 8(2) recognises 
that fundamental principles of state policy are not 
laws but “principles” that have to be applied by the 
state when making laws. And to equate 
“principles” with “laws” is to go against the law of 
the Constitution itself (para 84 p. 346). So article 
7(2) cannot be interpreted to mean that if any other 
law is inconsistent with the “principles” mentioned 
in part II then that law to the extent of the 
inconsistency will be void (para 85 p. 346). He 
fears that such interpretation would bring “the 
Fundamental Principles of State Policy at par with 
Fundamental Rights in so far as voidability is 
concerned (para 85 p. 346).” 
 
Interestingly, though the court declined to strike 
down the Ordinance for inconsistency with 
fundamental principles of state policy, it used 
articles 9 and 11 as touchstone to interpret article 
59 to hold that designating administrative units and 
forming elected local governments are the 
constitutional obligations of the state. Accordingly 
it ordered the Government to designate all the local 
government areas as administrative unit within four 
months and then to replace all non-elected persons 
by elected representatives within six months from 
the date of the judgment (Judgment on July 30 
1992). Unfortunately the order is yet to be 
executed. 
 
Fundamental Principles of State Policy 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT 
 
Though the case concerns only with the people’s 
right to participation, it has a direct impact on the 
enjoyment of other socio-economic rights as well. 
The judgement shall facilitate the State in passing 
laws detrimental to people’s right to basic 
necessaries of life including food, clothing, 
treatment, housing and education as all those rights 
are placed in part II of the constitution. Hence, the 
observations of the court as regards the validity of 
law contrary to the state principles in Kudrat-E-
Elahi require consideration. 
 
Firstly, the interpretation of article 7(2) offered by 
Kamal J fails to follow the proper tune of the 
article, as a plain reading of the article leads one to 
a different conclusion. Article 7(2) declares the 
Constitution to be the supreme law of the Republic 
and further proceeds to say that if any other law is 
inconsistent with this Constitution that other law 
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. It 
is not disputed that “principles” are not “law” in 
the ordinary sense and it is obvious that ‘principles’ 
may not supersede the ‘law’. But the term “this 
Constitution” in article 7(2) includes both the 
‘laws’ and ‘principles’ embodied in it. Moreover, 
the principles in Part II are not principles of 
ordinary weight or principles of any particular 
organ of the state, of any public corporation 
promulgated under its plenary or delegated 
legislative power. They are ‘constitutional 
principles’ and article 8(2) itself requires the state 
to apply these principles when making laws. 
 
Secondly, it may be asked whether article 8(2), by 
making the provisions of part II unenforceable by 
the court, has vested the legislature with power to 
flout these provisions by enacting laws in violation 
of these provisions. Logically article 8(2) cannot be 
interpreted as superseding article 7(2) on the 
yardstick of which all laws enacted by the 
legislature has to be tested [Huda AKMS, 
1997:281]. What is meant by unenforceability is 
that the directive principles can’t be enforced by 
and through judicial process to compel the state to 
carry them out, if it can’t do. This is not to say that 
it can throw them to the winds, and can enact laws 
openly in opposition to them. A court can 
unambiguously declare a law unconstitutional as 
being manifestly opposed to the fundamental 
principle of state policy (Jain Kagzi Mc, 
2004:938). 
Thirdly, the article 8(2) has five parts – the 
principles: 
• shall be fundamental to the governance of 
Bangladesh; 
• shall be applied by the State in making of 
laws; 
• shall be a guide to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and other laws of 
Bangladesh; 
• shall form the basis of the work of the 
State and its citizens; and  
• shall not be judicially enforceable. 
 
It seems that while declining to nullify a law on the 
ground of inconsistency with the principles and 
using the principles only as an interpretative tool, 
judiciary is ready to enforce the fifth and third 
criteria respectively and not the other three criteria 
set out in article 8(2). It may be asked whether 
article 8(2) binds the judiciary only and leaves the 
executive and legislature out of its ambit. 
 
Fourthly, by invoking the phrase ‘shall not be 
judicially enforceable’, Ahmed Shahabuddin CJ 
held that if the state ‘does not or cannot’ implement 
the principles, the court cannot compel. What is 
missing in this argument is that though the court 
cannot compel progression, it can always pin down 
retrogression. In this regard Justice Badrul Haider 
Chowdhury of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court in Anwar Hossain v Bangladesh 
1989 BLD(Spl) 1 has stated that: 
 
“Though the directive principles are not 
enforceable by any court, the principles therein laid 
down are nevertheless fundamental in the 
Governance of the country and it shall be the duty 
of the state to apply these principles in making 
laws. It is a protected Article (article 8- author) in 
our Constitution and the legislature cannot amend 
this Article without referendum. This alone shows 
that the executive cannot flout the directive 
principles. The endeavour of the Government must 
be to realise these aims and not to whittle them 
down (para 53 p 61).” 
 
Lastly, the fear of fundamental principles 
becoming at par with fundamental rights is not a 
substantiated one. Conversely, the tune is 
somewhat opposite in the constitution of 
Bangladesh. The constitution has discarded the 
supremacy of rights doctrine by inserting article 
47(1) (Ahmed Naim 1994:91). Article 47(1) 
provides that no law shall be deemed to be void on 
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the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away 
or abridge any of the rights guaranteed by Part III 
which is declared to be enacted to give effect to 
any of the fundamental principles of state policy set 
out in Part II. As regards the relative strength of 
rights and principles, it is pertinent to consult the 
Indian jurisprudence. 
 
IV. COMPARATIVE CASE LAW FROM 
INDIA 
 
The Indian Constitution is similar to that of 
Bangladesh in this regard as socio-economic rights 
are included as directive principles of state policy. 
In the constitution of India a detailed list of human 
rights has been incorporated in the form of 
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles under 
Part III and Part IV of the constitution respectively. 
Despite the classification of the rights and 
principles, there has been, in practice dynamic 
interaction between these two parts, which 
gradually enhanced the status of the principles 
(Prasad Anirud 1976:85). 
 
Initially the Indian Supreme Court in State of 
Madras v Champkam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 
226, 525, MH Quareshi v State of Bihar AIR 1958 
SC 731 and Re Kerala Education Bill AIR 1958 
SC 956 took the stand that directive principles have 
to conform to and run subsidiary to the chapter on 
fundamental rights. 
 
However, in Kesavananda Bharati v State of 
Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 the court held that what 
is fundamental in the governance of the country 
cannot be less significant than what is significant in 
the life of the individual and so rights and 
principles supplement each other. Mathew J 
constituting the majority in that case said: 
considerations of justice, of the common good, or 
"the general welfare in a democratic society" might 
require abridging or taking away of the 
Fundamental Rights (para 1760). 
 
Subsequently the 42nd amendment to the Indian 
Constitution in 1976 tightened the link between the 
‘principles’ and ‘rights’ by including the word 
‘socialist’ in the preamble and by amending article 
31C to confer primacy of a principle over 
fundamental rights. 
 
Inclusion of the word ‘socialist’ in the preamble to 
describe the nature of the statehood of India 
affirmed and established that Indian’s is a socialist 
constitution striking a balance between the 
individual liberty and the social interest (Ahmed, 
Naim 1994:94). 
 
Article 31C, however, was struck down in Minerva 
Mills Ltd v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 on 
the ground that giving absolute primacy to one part 
over the other disturbs the harmony of the 
constitution and ipso facto destroys the basic 
structure of the constitution (Chandrachud CJ, para 
22, 64). Bhagwati J (dissenting), however, 
maintained that if a law is enacted for the purpose 
of giving effect to a Directive Principle and it 
imposes a restriction on a Fundamental Right, it 
would be difficult to condemn such restriction as 
unreasonable or not in public interest (para 329 F-
H and 330 A-F). Later in Sanjeev Coke 
Manufacturing Co v Bharat Coking Coal Ltd 
AIR1982 SC 239 the Court affirmed Bhagwati’s 
dissenting opinion. 
 
The Indian literature can be a source of inspiration 
for Bangladeshi courts. Since the scheme of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh relating to the rights 
and principles is the same as in the Indian 
Constitution, the same position should obtain under 
our constitutional dispensation (Islam Mahmudul 
2002:56). Moreover whereas the Indian 
Constitution describes Part IV as “Directive 
Principles of State Policy”, the Bangladeshi one 
describes Part II as “Fundamental Principles of 
State Policy” which may be claimed to be 
calculated and deliberate. Keeping in mind that the 
Indian Supreme Court never shrugged its shoulders 
where it was called upon to give effect to principles 
(Mehta, PL & Verma N 1994:21), our judiciary is 






Fundamental principles are incapable of judicial 
enforcement only in the sense that the order, time, 
place and mode of fulfilling the policies should be 
left with the executive. At the same time the 
executive should not be allowed to defy the 
Constitution by allowing them to flout, ignore, 
disregard and defeat the fundamental principles of 
state policy in making laws. Any sort of 
retrogression is constitutionally unacceptable. An 
interpretation of the constitution that allows 
repelling laws inconsistent with the fundamental 
principles will be in template harmony with the 
Fundamental Principles of State Policy 
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